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Abstract
By the late-1950s, the Soviet Union acquired a strong position as a world oil exporter, thanks to 
major discoveries in the Ural-Volga area. The new availability prompted the USSR to greatly 
increase its exports, especially to West European countries. Such strategy was met with ambivalent 
reactions, depending on each countryʼs position and status on the world oil scene, as well as on their 
political and economic needs. In order to transport their oil to strategic areas within the Soviet 
Union and to Europe, the Soviets devised a project for a colossal pipeline system. This plan caused 
anxiety at NATO since Russian oil could be wielded as a weapon to weaken the West both militarily 
and economically. Beside being seen as potentially threatening for the interest of Anglo-American 
and French oil majors, the considerable amount of cheap oil the pipeline system would carry 
generated worries about Western Europe becoming dependent on the USSR for its energy. In order 
to complete the system, however, the Soviets needed considerable amounts of large-diameter steel 
pipes and equipment, which they had to import from the West. Thus in 1961 the US delegation at 
NATO proposed a comprehensive embargo of large-diameter pipes in order to delay the systemʼs 
construction. The proposal met with strong British opposition and a lukewarm attitude by a number 
of NATO members, and the debate soon came to revolve around 1) the definition of steel pipes as 
strategic items, and 2) whether a security rationale should be prioritized over an economic one when 
dealing with the Soviets. In this paper, I argue that the definition of what oil pipes are as 
technological artifacts, as well as their ultimate content, was ultimately shaped by the NATO debate 
on the US proposition. What an oil pipe was – or was not – and how it could be used, derived from 
the struggle to control or suppress commerce with the Soviet Union. 
Keywords: transnational history, Cold War history, NATO, pipelines, material politics
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Introduction
Between 1955 and 1965, Soviet oil production rose spectacularly from 71 to 243 million tons (Mt).  
This bonanza was the result of an immense prospecting effort, which bore its finest fruit in the Ural-
Volga region, where a number of large oilfields were discovered. Soon the crucial issue for the 
Soviet oil industry became the marketing of the newly-found oil, and a solution was found in its 
exportation to industrially-expanding Western Europe at prices that were significantly lower than 
those of the international oil market.1  
The extent to which such low prices were part of an explicit political strategy aimed at making 
Western Europe dependent on the USSR for its energy, or were rather an economic consequence of 
the quantities of oil found and of the Sovietsʼ urgent need of Western technologies in exchange, has 
long been debated ever since the phenomenon appeared.2 If one looks at the issue in hindsight, as 
energy analyst Robert Ebel did, the economic rationale stands out as the most likely.3 However, 
when one looks at the unfolding of events from a historical viewpoint, the knot is harder to unravel. 
In cases such as the one presented in this paper, it is not easy to distinguish between political, 
economic and military motives underlying a countryʼs policy. Most of the times these aspects were 
part of the same discourse, and the weight assigned to each of them by different historical actors 
varied according to each countryʼs contingent political agendas. While one may want to eliminate 
the roots of the problem by lumping economic and military motives under the rubric of ʻnational 
securityʼ, it is instead important to try and make a distinction among the diverse inflections of the 
phrase, because the prevalence of either narrative does not only define the competent institutional 
loci where matters are to be debated, but also gives an indication of which argumentative 
framework may be more opportune to employ in those loci.4 This inherent intricacy will become 
1 John A. Berry, “Oil and Soviet Policy in the Middle East,” 150. Source reported: Economist Intelligence Unit, 
Quarterly Economic Review, “USSR Annual Supplement - 1971”, 10; Robert E. Ebel, Communist Trade in Oil and 
Gas, 40; D. L. Spencer, “The Role of Oil in Soviet Foreign Economic Policy,” 98.
2 See for example: Ebel, Communist Trade in Oil and Gas; Harold L. Hoskins, Problems Raised by the Soviet Oil 
Offensive; Jonathan P. Stern, Soviet Oil and Gas Exports to the West.
3 Ebel, Communist Trade in Oil and Gas.
4 Joseph J. Romm, Defining national security; Prabhakaran Paleri, National Security.
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patent in the paper, when I show that constant, economically-oriented consultations between 
governments and their respective national oil companies took place in parallel to the military-
oriented debate at NATO, and contributed to shape it. 
While the rationale of the Soviet oil export strategy may not be easy to grasp, the means chosen by 
the Soviet administration to bring the countryʼs oil to Europe was straightforward: a gigantic 
pipeline system (see Fig. 1) would connect production sites to its prospective markets, namely the 
westernmost brims of the Iron Curtain, and possibly extend to Western Europe. The pipeline 
system, whose westernmost terminals were planned to be in Eastern Germany and Czechoslovakia, 
was also expected to reach the shores of the Caspian Sea, and as far as China on its eastern path. 
More branches had been planned to the Baltic ports of Klaipeda and Ventspils, and to the Far 
Eastern port of Nakhodka.5 This project, nevertheless, would require particular abilities in 
producing the materials for building the pipeline system, namely a number of advanced 
technological artifacts such as turbines, compressors, and especially large-diameter steel pipes 
(namely, pipes with a diameter larger than  40”), which the Soviets did not have the adequate know-
how or industrial might to produce in required amounts in the early 1960s. It was the Soviet effort 
to get hold of these technologies, and the different estimates of Soviet productive capabilities, that 
gave origin to the debate at the core of this paper. 
Historians of technology have long recognized the importance that social, political and economic 
factors play in shaping what a technological artifact is. In particular Gabrielle Hecht has proposed 
that we should think about the underlying political dimensions of technological networks and their 
interconnectedness in favoring the spreading of some technologies globally (she coined the term 
ʻtechnopoliticsʼ to indicate such indissoluble connection). On the one hand, this paper enriches her 
analysis by showing the crucial role that oil pipes had in affecting international relations during the 
Cold War. On the other hand, it also highlights that the Cold War shaped the definition of what 
ʻstrategicʼ oil pipes were.6 
5 NATO Archives, Brussels (NATOA) – AC/127-WP/56 (Revised), confidential, ʻECONAD, Sino-Soviet Bloc Oil on 
World Markets, Note by the Economic Service,ʼ 11 July 1960, p. 2. 
6 Trevor J. Pinch, and Wiebe E. Bijker, “The Social Construction of Facts and Artefacts,” 399-441; Gabrielle Hecht, 
The Radiance of France; Michael Thad Allen, and Gabrielle Hecht (eds.), Technologies of Power; Gabrielle Hecht, 
and Paul N. Edwards, The Technopolitics of Cold War; Dolores L. Augustine, Red Prometheus. See also: John Krige,
American Hegemony and the Postwar Reconstruction of Science in Europe.
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Fig. 1 USSR crude and product pipelines in late 19607
7 Archives Historiques du Groupe Total, La Défense (AHTOTAL) - Fonds Total-CFP, b. 92.26/31, excerpt from the 
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In particular, the actual understanding of the pipesʼ sizes and functions was negotiated in the 
measures that the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) implemented to face the Soviet ʻoil 
floodingʼ threat. The one and a half year long debate that followed the proposal by the US 
delegation at NATO of an embargo on large-diameter pipes and pipeline equipment was indicative 
of the manifold status of pipes as technological items, and reminds of the argument Hecht put 
forward about uranium. Like ʻnuclearityʼ for uranium, the strategic nature of pipes was all but 
obvious; rather, it depended on the political context in which these items were immersed. 8 
The present study also refines our understanding of the role of pipelines in political history, which 
has been emphasized by historian, Timothy Mitchell, and more recently by geographer, Andrew 
Barry. Amongst other things, Mitchell and Barry have highlighted the importance of pipelines as 
sites of intense political struggle, and of the control over points of passage such as railway 
connections and pipelines for flows of materials to be effective. As will become clear in what 
follows, the availability of large-diameter pipes came to constitute an example of such points of 
passage; it can also be interpreted, in Thomas Hughesʼs terminology, as a ʻreverse salientʼ, namely a
component of a technological system that, because of its insufficient development, compromises the 
effective operativeness of the system as a whole.9  
Finally, moving from the history of technology and political science to the history of energy, my 
paper follows up the work by historian Per Högselius on Euro-Soviet gas trade from the late 1960s 
on, and aims to extend his narrative back in time to the early 1960s, at a time when oil not gas was 
the main actor of energy trade relations between the USSR and Western Europe. My analysis of the 
NATO embargo also aims to enlarge to a transnational framework Angela Stentʼs seminal 
monograph on West German-Soviet relations, which extensively covered the embargo from the 
West German point of view, and which because of its early date of publication could not make use 
of contemporaneous archival sources.10 
I will first examine the global consequences of the Soviet oil strategy, including national political 
reactions to it. I will then move to the core of the paper, namely the embargo debate at NATO, and 
Journal des Carburants, 20 November 1960.
8 Gabrielle Hecht, “The Power of Nuclear Things,” 1-30; Gabrielle Hecht, Being Nuclear. In The Radiance of France,
15,  Hecht defines technopolitics as the “strategic practice of designing or using technology to constitute, embody, or 
enact political goals”.
9 Timothy Mitchell, “Carbon democracy,” 399-432; Timothy Mitchell, Carbon Democracy; Thomas P. Hughes, 
Networks of Power; Andrew Barry, Material politics.
10 Per Högselius, Red Gas; Angela Stent, From embargo to Ostpolitik.
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show how it ultimately became polarized over a British, pro-trade position, and an American pro-
security (and thus contra-trade) stance. Throughout the debate, US and UK administrations held 
conflicting points of view, which corresponded to two markedly different perceptions of the Soviet 
threat, the former being based on the preponderance of arguments linked to military security, the 
latter centered on prioritizing considerations relative to bilateral trade. 
In general, NATO members fought their battle through industrial estimates, the mobilization of their 
military and intelligence agents, as well as of their oil companies, and through the possibility to 
distinguish between different kinds of pipes according to their possible contents (oil or gas). During 
and because of this debate, the nature of the ʻpipeʼ artifact changed, its final status as technological 
artifact ultimately resulting from a co-produced negotiation. I will conclude my paper by analyzing 
the resolution of the debate and its repercussions on European trade. 
The ʻred oil floodʼ
One of the first signs of American anxiety vis-à-vis the increase in Soviet oil production is to be 
found in the words of Allen Dulles, the then-Director of the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), who 
in 1958 warned the US cabinet, led by President Dwight Eisenhower, that “[t]he free world face[d] 
a quite dangerous situation in the Soviet capacity to dislocate established markets”. 11 Indeed, as 
mentioned, the Soviet Union soon increased its exports. Over ten years, the exportsʼ share of total 
Soviet production rose from 5.2 percent to 26.4 percent, and oil exported to non-Communist 
countries increased from 3.8 Mt in 1955 to a stunning 35.5 Mt in 1965. Prices offered by the USSR 
were so low compared to the international market price that most US sources did not hesitate to talk 
about market dumping. To exemplify, in 1957 the Soviet oil barrel on the international market sold 
at $2.06, compared to $2.79 for Middle Eastern oil and to $2.92 for Venezuelan oil; and in the next 
years Soviet price to West European countries further decreased to as little as $1 a barrel in the case 
of an Italian-Russian agreement signed in 1960.12  
In 1958, however, Soviet oil transportation was still being handicapped by an overloaded railway, 
which carried around 60 percent of its overall amount, compared to 5 percent in the USA. The 
Soviets aimed to meet 35 percent of oil transport requirements via a new pipeline system, whose 
11 Quoted from: Daniel Yergin, The Prize, 497. Source reported: Eisenhower Library, Cabinet Minutes, July 25, 1958, 
Whitman Files, 1953-1961, Cabinet Series, b. 11.
12 Ebel, Communist Trade in Oil and Gas, 40, 44, 61. Ebelʼs data are sourced from various annual statistical trade 
handbooks issues by the Ministry of Trade of the USSR; Halford L. Hoskins, and Leon M. Herman, Soviet Oil in the 
Cold War, 5. 
6
European branch would be named Druzhba (the Russian for ʻfriendshipʼ), and which would connect 
the new oilfields to its potential outlets. Besides allowing them to relieve their railway network, the 
system would also allow the Soviets to increase exports and reduce the demand for tankers.  In 
addition, the pipeline could easily be connected to seaport terminals where the Soviet Navyʼs 
vessels were moored.13 
As a consequence the Soviet oil flow, at least at a first analysis, promised to upset the Western bloc 
militarily and economically. More worryingly for the US, by the late 1950s individual countries that 
were members of Western-bloc international organizations, such as the European Economic 
Community (EEC) and NATO, notably Italy and West Germany, were already in the process of 
negotiating agreements to import Soviet hydrocarbons, and also agreed to sell the pipes and 
equipment the Russians needed. The US administration first, and NATO afterwards, swiftly moved 
in to block these deals. The bone of contention, oil-for-technology barter deals, and large-diameter 
pipes in particular, did not just feature as an object of political controversy, but their very nature was 
moulded in the clash between national representatives. 
Soviet oil exports were part of a larger scheme, in which barter agreements were employed as 
powerful economic and diplomatic weapons, enabling beneficiary countries to find outlets for their 
productions. When trading with Egypt, the Russians bartered oil for cotton; in the case of Cuba, 
they swapped oil for sugar. Technoscentific expertise was also used as a lever to convince 
developing countries to collaborate. This was a cornerstone of Soviet oil policy, and was 
successfully employed in Afghanistan, Ethiopia, Pakistan and Egypt. The USSR provided crews of 
experts to assist the locals with building pipelines and tankers, executing geological studies, and 
training executives of national oil industries. Indeed, such training was not limited to technical 
aspects: it catered for political and social engineering.14
Due to its possible military effects, Soviet plans for Druzhba soon generated frantic debate at 
NATO. From 1960, the analysis of the pipeline question came under the scrutiny of NATOʼs 
Committee of Economic Advisers (ECONAD), operating under the authority of the North Atlantic 
Council (NAC). Founded in 1957, ECONAD was the place designed for the study of a number of 
13 NATOA – AC/127-D/68, confidential, ʻECONAD, Report by the Ad Hoc Study Group on Soviet Oil Policy to 
Econad,ʼ 23 May 1961, pp. 8-12.
14 Niklas Jensen-Eriksen, “The Cold War in Energy Markets,” 201. Source reported: The National Archives, Kew 
(TNA) – Ministry of Power (POWE) 33/243, “Russian oil imports”, MOP, 13 May 1960. See also: AHTOTAL – 
Fonds Total-CFP, b. 90.4/102, Revue de presse, n. 30, Chronologie des accords politiques entre lʼURSS et les pays 
arabes, December 1958; The Reporter, “The Soviet Oil Offensive”, by Leon M. Herman, 21 June 1962. p. 27.
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oil-related issues, including assessments of Russian oil production, exports and reserves, NATO 
countriesʼ oil imports from Communist countries, and issues regarding pipelines. ECONAD was 
particularly concerned with those issues that had political or defense implications, or that affected 
the economic health of the Atlantic Community.  Envisioned as a standing committee, it was meant 
to complete the functions conducted by the Committee on Soviet Economic Policy (however, the 
functions of the two committees sometimes overlapped).15 In order to understand the positions 
successively taken by NATO country members at ECONAD in 1960-2, it is firstly essential to 
examine country membersʼ stances with respect to the Soviet oil offensive and pipeline projects.
National reactions to the Soviet oil offensive
Reactions to the Soviet oil offensive varied from country to country. While, quite expectedly, the 
American government firmly refused to allow Soviet imports into the United States, European 
positions were more varied, depending on each countryʼs historical record in trading with the 
USSR, as well as on the situation regarding their industrial needs. In terms of purchase of Soviet 
exports, the top three West European countries in 1957 (the UK, West Germany and France) 
imported merchandise for 756, 286 and 268 million rubles respectively. Exports to Italy amounted 
to 117 million. However, Italy was the only country among these whose balance of trade was 
negative.16 
As far as the UK was concerned, in late-1950s Harold Macmillanʼs government had been divided 
on the issue on an oil embargo on Soviet imports. It eventually implemented one in 1959, but 
serious divergences remained between government departments, notably between the Board of 
Trade (against) and the Ministry of Power (in favor), which would reemerge over the next years. In 
France Victor de Metz, the President of the flagship of French oil, the Compagnie française des 
pétroles, feared that Soviet trade could extend to the entire EEC and threaten the marketing of 
recently-found oil from French territories in Africa. He hoped that an alliance between oil majors 
and Arab producers could counteract the ʻoil floodʼ.17 However, the heavy dependence of a number 
of Arab countries on the Soviet economic and technical expertise discouraged them from taking 
15 NATOA – AC/127-D/1, confidential, ʻCommitte of Economic Advisers (ECONAD), Date of the first meeting and 
programme of work - Note by the Chairman,ʼ 22 March 1957, p. 2. 
16 The equivalence in 1957 was 1 ruble = 4 dollars (http://www.cbr.ru/currency_base/OldVal.aspx, accessed 10 April 
201), so the figures reported correspond to $3.02 billion for the UK, $1.14 billion for West Germany, $1.07 billion 
for France, and $468 million for Italy. Bruna Bagnato, Prove di Ostpolitik, 97.
17 Jensen-Eriksen, “The Cold War in Energy Markets”, 204. The embargo notwithstanding, Italian-labelled oil products 
made from Soviet oil were sold by ENIʼs British affiliate in the UK in the early 1960s (Spencer, “The Role of Oil in 
Soviet Foreign Economic Policy,” 100-1); Emmaneul Catta, Victor De Metz, 289.
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retaliatory measures.18
Italy and West Germany were instead deeply involved in trading with the USSR, and commercial 
exchanges existed between Soviet firms and many large Italian industrial concerns such as FIAT, 
the car manufacturer. In particular in 1960 the Italian public oil company, Ente nazionale 
idrocarburi (ENI), led by Enrico Mattei, signed a massive oil-for-technology supply contract with 
Soviet state-run company, Soyuznefteexport (SNE), which caused scandal in the Western industrial 
and political world. The Soviets would provide ENI with 12 Mt of crude and fuel oil over four 
years, in exchange for synthetic rubber, steel pipes and pipeline equipment.19 
Germanyʼs steel producers from the Ruhr region were also in good terms with a number of Soviet 
firms, and two months before the Italian contract, West Germany also signed an important barter 
contract with the Soviets. In general, West German trade with the USSR rose from $196.5 million in 
1959 to $401.5 million in 1962. Among German exports to the USSR were plants for chemical and 
extractive industry, iron and steel products, ships and large-diameter pipes; among its imports, crude 
oil and products.20 However, unlike France and Germany, which could count on large domestic 
resources of coal, Italy almost totally depended on oil (and to a lesser extent, on indigenous gas). 
Therefore, its reliance on Soviet imports was seen as a greater threat to western security than in the 
German case. 
In general, by early 1960 Europeʼs trade with the Soviets came under the scrutiny of American 
political circles. In the US press, as well as in the National Security Councilʼs and State 
Departmentʼs reports, dangers deriving from dependency on Soviet oil were repeatedly highlighted: 
the Russians, most commentators claimed, may decide to abruptly interrupt their deliveries 
following unfavorable political decisions by Western bloc governments.21 Soviet dependency on 
18 On Soviet aid to Arab countries, see: NATOA – AC/89-WP/67, confidential (later unclassified), ʻSub-Committee on 
Soviet Economic Policy – The Economic Offensive of the Sino-Soviet Bloc, Note by the Chairmanʼ, 6 July 1960; 
AC/89-WP/76 (Revised 1), confidential (later unclassified), ʻSub-Committee on Soviet Economic Policy – The 
Economic Offensive of the Sino-Soviet Bloc (1st July, 1960 - 31st December, 1960)ʼ, 12 May 1961; Archives 
Nationales, Pierrefitte-sur-Seine (AN) – 19900317/8, fd. 1, sub-fd. Afrique 1957/77, secret, Note SDECE, 
Pénétration italienne (ENI) et soviétique dans le domaine pétrolier en Afrique, 30 August 1960 (FOIA n° 111 382).
19 Archivio storico del Ministero degli affari esteri, Rome (ASMAE) – Telegrammi ordinari, Russia (Ambasciata 
Mosca), 1960, vol. 59 arrivo (Jul-Dec), n. 36288, Italian Embassy in Moscow (Itemb Moscow) (Pietromarchi) to 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs, ʻContratto ENI-Finsiderʼ, 3 October 1960; n. 37331, Itemb Moscow (Pietromarchi) to 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs, ʻImportazione petrolioʼ, 11 October 1960. 
20 Stent, From embargo to Ostpolitik, 97; ASMAE – Telegrammi ordinari, Russia (Ambasciata Mosca), 1961, vol. 55 
arrivo (Jan-Jun), n. 13, Itemb Moscow (Pietromarchi) to Ministry of Foreign Affairs, ʻStampa sovieticaʼ, 2 January 
1961; Stent, From embargo to Ostpolitik.
21 TNA – Foreign Office (FO) 371/153362, fd. RT 1532/17, P. J. E. Male, FO, to J. Gwynn, Ministry of Power, ʻItaly 
and Russian Oilʼ, New York Times article, ʻItaly Oil Deal With Soviet Weakens Her Ties to Westʼ, 11 November 
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Western technology, however, was largely neglected in those articles and reports. Discontinuing 
exports would have deprived the Eastern giant of part of its industrial power. This reason, more than 
any other, made an interruption of supplies unlikely: energy dependence on the European side was 
thus balanced by technical dependence on the Soviet side. In addition, Stent notes, the urgency of 
the American rhetoric was not commensurate to the real supply situation, in that Western Europe 
was not at the time heavily dependent on Soviet oil. Political factors linked to Cold War climate 
may have distorted perceptions of the economic significance of Soviet oil exports, and may have 
joined worries by Western oil companies about a likely loss of market shares.22
American anxieties were clearly expressed in two documents produced by the US Senate in 1961 
and 1962 respectively, namely Soviet Oil in the Cold War and Problems raised by the Soviet oil 
offensive. In those studies, Halford Hoskins, a senior specialist in international relations, and Leon 
Herman, an analyst in Soviet economics, warned that Soviet exports to foreign countries constituted 
“a political hand that has worn the economic glove”.23 They maintained that if the Italian attitude 
spread over Western Europe, more countries would dislocate part of their supplies from the majors 
to the USSR, thus causing fewer revenues to American, British, Dutch and French international 
companies.24 
The American position mirrored the stance held by the French administration. Tellingly at the 
European Parliament, the French Gaullist deputy, Christian de la Malène, prompted the European 
Commission to set up periodical exchanges of data on imports of oil products from all origins. In 
the statistics provided by the Commission for the first five months of 1960, the position of Italy as 
the largest Soviet oil importer was striking; Italyʼs imports were three times larger than West 
Germanyʼs and four times larger than Franceʼs.25 
ENIʼs plans to build a pipeline for the Soviets between the USSR and East Germany, and a second 
one to connect Italyʼs Adriatic seaport of Trieste to Vienna, did nothing to appease Western 
governments. The first threat was defused through international diplomatic pressure. The French 
and US governments were promptly informed by their national secret services of the news of the 
1960.
22 Stent,  From embargo to Ostpolitik, 100. 
23 Hoskins and Herman, Soviet Oil; Halford L. Hoskins, Problems Raised by the Soviet Oil Offensive. The quote is 
from: Hoskins and Herman, Soviet Oil in the Cold War, 4.
24 Ibid., 6.
25 AN – b. 19800118/3 CEE/Hydrocarbures, 1960-2, fd. Politique vis-à-vis des pays de lʼEst, Council of European 
Communities - General Secretary, ʻNote dʼinformation - Assemblée Parlementaire européenneʼ, 7 October 1960 
(FOIA n° 111 382).
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Italian-Soviet East Germany project, which threatened to favor the possibility of a future connection 
with West Germany.26 The State Department suggested the Italian Embassy in Paris apply pressure 
on his government, and eventually the pipeline agreement was not finalized.27 
As for the second project, the Trieste-Vienna pipeline might easily be linked to Bratislava, where 
the Soviets planned to establish one of Druzhbaʼs terminals.28 From a geographical viewpoint, 
argued the Swiss newspaper, Neue Zürcher Zeitung, the Soviet project was more enticing than a 
continued commitment to majorsʼ oil from the Middle East, transported through the Mediterranean. 
The proximity of Sweden and the Netherlands to the Baltic port of Klaipeda, where another 
terminal of the Soviet European pipeline was to be built, would make the Soviet pipeline a constant 
temptation for countries belonging to the Western Bloc, thanks to the savings its use would allow. 
Moreover from the Baltic port, oil could easily be carried to West Germany by railway. On top of 
that, by linking the Soviet pipeline to ENIʼs planned pipeline, Soviet oil could reach the 
Mediterranean though a new outlet, and thence be exported by tanker to areas already supplied by 
Anglo-American majors in Southern Europe, thus increasing the quantities that were already being 
delivered from the Soviet Union via the Black Sea.29 It was over this complex background that 
ECONAD started its meetings on Soviet oil in the summer of 1960. 
“Measures need to be taken”: ECONADʼs early study and the embargo proposal
In July 1960, ECONAD met to examine the impact of Soviet oil on world markets.  In the same 
month, it decided that NATO members should prepare statistics on their trade with the Soviet bloc, 
26 Archivio Storico ENI, Pomezia (ASENI) – Fondo ENI, Estero, b. 2, fd. 7E6, letter, Itemb Moscow (Pietromarchi) to 
ENI President (Enrico Mattei), 25 November 1959; ENI President (Enrico Mattei) to Itemb Moscow (Luca 
Pietromarchi), 28 December 1959; AN - 19900317/13, fd. 1, sub-fd. Italie 1955/1979, secret, Note SDECE, 
Lʼactivité de lʼEnte Nazionale Idrocarburi (mai 1958 - septembre 1959), 23 October 1959, p. 5 (FOIA n° 111 382); 
National Archives and Records Administration, College Park, Maryland (NARA) – CIA Records Search Tool 
Database (CREST), CIA Current Intelligence Weekly Summary, confidential, ʻItalian Oil Combine May Build 
Pipeline for USSRʼ, 28 January 1960. p. 11; NARA – Record Group (RG) 59, Central Decimal File, 1960-1963, b. 
2694, file 865.2553/1-2660, confidential, Foreign Service Dispatch, US Embassy Rome (Amemb Rome) to State 
Department, 26 January 1960; Bagnato, Prove di Ostpolitik, 176.
27 ENI eventually supplied certain pumping and auxiliary equipment, while the plan to provide technical assistance 
toward installing the pipelines was dropped. NARA – RG 59, Central Decimal File, 1960-1963, b. 2694: file 
865.2553/2-660, confidential, Memorandum of Conversation, ʻItalian Government Guaranteed Credit for Soviet 
Pipeline Projectʼ, 6 February 1960; file 865.25553/3-160, limited official use, Amemb Rome (Zellerbach) to State 
Department, 1 March 1960; AN – 19900317/13, fd. 1, sub-fd. Italie 1955/1979, secret, Note SDECE, Lʼactivité de 
lʼEnte Nazionale Idrocarburi (octobre 1959 – octobre 1960), 18 October 1960, p. 15 (FOIA n° 111 382).
28 TNA – FO 371/153362, fd. RT 1532/6, f. RT 1532/6D, A. A. Jarratt, Ministry of Power, to J. T. Fearnley, FO, 17 
June 1960, p. 10.
29 ASENI – Rassegna stampa estera 1961, n. 39, para 370, Neue Zürcher Zeitung, 11 June. The project for the Trieste-
Vienna pipeline was approved only in 1963. The laying of the Transalpine Pipeline, as it would be called, was 
eventually to include a number of majors beside ENI. It was commissioned in 1967, while its extension to Vienna 
had to wait until 1970 to become operational.
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and proposed a common policy be outlined for Western oil-supplying countries in the face of the 
Soviet oil threat. An ad hoc Study Group on Soviet Oil Policy was then established. NATOʼs need of 
such an assessment became even more urgent following the creation in September of the 
Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries, which generated fears the USSR may conclude an 
agreement with Arab producers to the ultimate detriment of Western oil majors.30
ECONAD had charted Soviet efforts to increase oil exports since the beginning of 1960, noticing 
that these had been highly successful, especially outside Europe, and that attempts to stop them had 
failed. Were this not enough, at the same time the Russian tanker fleetʼs capacity had been growing 
at an alarming speed, further boosting Soviet exporting capacities.31 From September, the Study 
Group debated a common policy to stem these dangers. The national delegations abided to the 
recommendations issued by their national oil companies. That national enterprises collaborate with 
their NATO delegations within the Study Group was to be expected, and adds to the strength of the 
argument about a symbiosis between military and economic motivations in confronting the Soviet 
oil export strategy. But these contacts also reveal the network of acquaintances between the oil 
industry and top-rank personalities in national administrations. 
US majors such as Standard Oil of New Jersey, Standard Oil of New York and Texaco lobbied the 
State Department. British Petroleum and Royal Dutch-Shell also had frequent exchanges with the 
British Foreign Office, and as historian Niklas Jensen-Eriksen has emphasized, when the Joint 
Intelligence Bureau of the Ministry of Defence was asked to draft a memorandum on Soviet oil 
exports in 1958, it was to Shell that the Ministry of Power asked to collect materials for it.32 The 
Compagnie française des pétroles worked closely with the French Foreign Ministry, to the point of 
plainly suggesting which tactics to pursue, and ENI had frequent contacts with the Study Groupʼs 
Italian delegation.33 
30 NATOA – AC/127-WP/56 (Revised), confidential, ʻECONAD, Sino-Soviet Bloc Oil on World Markets, Note by the
Economic Service,ʼ 11 July 1960, p. 1; Petroleum Press Service (PPS) (1959) “Dix millions de tonnes de pétrole 
exportées par le bloc soviétique”, XXVI (3): 111-2; NATOA – AC/127-R/53, confidential, ʻECONAD, Meeting held 
at the Permanent Headquarters on 21 July 1960, Decision Sheet,ʼ 22 July 1960, p. 1; NATOA – AC/127-WP/64, 
confidential, ʻECONAD, Study Group on Soviet Oil Policy, Note by the Chairman,ʼ 23 September 1960, p. 1, 3. On 
the ad hoc Study Group, see also: Bagnato, Prove di Ostpolitik, 383 ff.
31 NATOA – AC/127-WP/66, confidential, ʻECONAD, Recent Facts and Figures on Petroleum, Note by the Economic 
Service,ʼ 30 September 1960, p. 9, 11-3; Spencer, “The Role of Oil in Soviet Foreign Economic Policy,” 102.
32 Niklas Jensen-Eriksen, “British government, business and the Soviet Cold War oil offensive, 1957-1964”, 8-9. 
Sources: TNA – FO 371/153362, fd. RT 1532/10, secret, ʻRelations between Signor Mattei and the Western Oil 
Group,ʼ Ashley Clarke, British Embassy Rome, to Sir Paul Gore-Booth, K. C. M. G. FO, 11 August 1960; TNA – 
POWE 33/2443: “Note on Soviet Bloc oil exports to the Free World,” J. R. Jenkins, 16 September 1958; A minute 
by A. B. Powell, 19 May 1960.
33 AHTOTAL – Fonds Total-CFP, b. 92.26/31, fd. Pétrole soviétique: Notes de M. de Laboulaye, confidential, ʻNote 
pour M. Granier de Lilliac,ʼ 18 November 1960; ASENI – Fondo ENI, Estero, b. 2, fd. 7E2, Ruffolo (ENI) to Giorgi 
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The NATO Study Group, under the chairmanship of the British Keith Stock, Undersecretary of the
Petroleum Division at the Ministry of Power, met for the first time two months after the signature of
the 1960 ENI-SNE agreement. Group members were asked to provide data on current and planned
Soviet oil imports to their countries and of their exports to the USSR; on the conditions under which
such trade took place; and on the destination of imported oil.34 A draft report by the Study Group
was ready by May 1961: it  stated that  due to the substantial trade in Soviet-bloc-originated oil
products by both NATO and non-NATO countries, restrictive measures needed to be taken and im-
plemented by all members.35 NATOʼs ambition to reform East-West oil trading was now taking oil
geopolitics to a new level, making the Atlantic Alliance the transnational forum for conflicts that
had hitherto unfolded through national representations.
Based on the results of this group, the US NATO delegate, Alfred Reifman, suggested an embargo
on Western-bloc large-diameter pipes and pipeline equipment, based on the strategic and military
advantages the USSR would achieve from its exports. The embargo, comments Stent, “more than
any other single incident, highlighted the U.S.ʼs primary role both in he establishment of the East-
West trade agenda and in the politicization of specific economic issues”.36  It also marked a turning
point in the definitional pathway that would transform pipes from freely tradable to embargoed mer-
chandise. 
The American argument: Druzhba as a military threat
Following the embargo proposal, ECONAD requested that a study be made before taking a defini-
tive decision. The new study group was formed in Washington, and when its final report reached
ECONAD in September, it closely reflected the American viewpoint. The report argued that Druzh-
ba had “obvious military significance”.37 As a consequence, at a following meeting of the pipeline
Study Group,  US General  Major  Francis  Piggott,  Assistant  Chief  of  Staff  (Intelligence)  at  the
and Carbone (Italian delegation to NATO), ʼMemorandum,ʼ 29 December 1960.
34 NATOA - AC/127(O)R/1, confidential, ʻECONAD, Ad Hoc Study Group on Soviet Oil Policy, Meeting held at the 
Permanent Headquarters, 9 December 1960, Decision Sheetʼ, 21 December 1960, p. 2
35 NATOA - AC/127(O)-WP/2 (Revised), confidential, ʻAd Hoc Study Group on Soviet Oil Policy, Draft Report to the 
Econadʼ, 28 March 1961; NATOA - NATOA – AC/127-D/68, confidential, ʻECONAD, Report by the Ad Hoc Study 
Group on Soviet Oil Policy to ECONAD,ʼ 23 May 1961, pp. 2-6.
36 NATOA – AC/127-D/83, secret, ʻECONAD, Soviet oil and gas pipelines, Note by the Secretary,ʼ [2 or 3] October 
1961, p. 5; AC/127-R/71, confidential, ʻECONAD, Meeting held at the Permanent Headquarters, on 20 July 1961, 
Decision Sheet,ʼ 4 August 1961, p. 5. On the pipes issue, see also: Bagnato, Prove di Ostpolitik, 382 ff. Stentʼs quote 
is from: Stent, From embargo to Ostpolitik, 93.
37 Quoted from: NATOA - AC/127-D/68, p. 6.
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Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe (SHAPE), urged that the construction of the pipeline
be delayed, in order to prevent supplying both the Soviet Navy and Soviet divisions in Eastern Eu-
rope. Indeed unlike the Soviet railway, which ran north to south, pipelines would run east to west,
and the flow of oil in that direction would make supplying the Soviet military machine in Eastern
Europe easier.38
According to the report, moreover, the Soviets were not producing large-diameter pipes over 40” of
diameter, and there seemed to be no evidence at that time that they were progressing rapidly enough
to build large capacity tube mills or steel rolling mills capable of producing steel plate wide enough
to enable single-weld 40” pipe to be manufactured. Considerations on the Soviet ability to access
certain technologies led the Study Group to conclude that, although the Soviets claimed to be able
to produce pipe by welding two pre-formed halves, there was no indication that they were actually
doing so. Large-diameter pipes were critical to the Soviet oil export strategy, as they would make it
possible to improve the flow rate at which oil could be delivered to Europe significantly. Soviet in-
dustries were also reported to be unable to build gas turbines, electric motors and other equipment
required for 40” lines.  As for auxiliary equipment, they were in need of Western technology as cor-
rosion was a major problem in their pipes and equipment, due to the high sulphur content of their
oil. They also lacked pumps, compressors, turbines, valves, pipe fittings, large electrical engines,
gauges, telemetering and short-wave control equipment. An embargo, the reportʼs compilers con-
cluded, would effectively delay the completion of Druzhba.39 
By the time the report was presented at ECONAD, the significance of pipelines for the Soviet 
marine military apparatus was clearer than ever to NATO, and added to concerns deriving from 
Russian technological progress in war vessels; concerns, which had eventually led NATO to 
establish an ad hoc group to produce oceanographic knowledge for anti-submarine warfare needs in 
late 1958. NATO military authorities were especially worried about the Soviet war ships docked 
along the Baltic and Pacific coasts. The Soviet railway and naval units, relieved of transporting oil, 
could then be used to carry logistically critical goods, such as ammunition and foodstuffs.40
It was not the first time the USA had proposed blockades in order to hinder Soviet industrial 
38 NATOA – AC/127-D/83, secret, ʻECONAD, Soviet oil and gas pipelines, Note by the Secretary,ʼ [2 or 3] October
1961, p. 5. The identity of the military representative is not specified in this document, but this is revealed by other
documentation.
39 Ibid., 7-14.
40 Simone Turchetti, “Sword, Shield and Buoys,” 208, 224; NATOA – AC/127-WP/85, secret, ʻECONAD, Soviet Oil 
and Gas Pipelines, Standing Group views,ʼ 9 April 1962, p. 1.
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projects. For example in 1946, a penicillin plant program launched by the United Nations Relief and 
Rehabilitation Administration to build up the capacity of the pharmaceutical industry in Eastern and 
Southern Europe, was significantly delayed by an American embargo on extractor technologies. The 
State Department refused to grant exporting licenses for the necessary equipment to pass the Iron 
Curtain.41 Other products including radioisotopes and computer equipment were also embargoed to 
stifle Soviet technological progress. In October 1960, after Cuban Prime Minister, Fidel Castro Ruz, 
nationalized the properties of US citizens and companies, an embargo was famously enacted against 
the Caribbean island.42 It is therefore not surprising that the US delegation hoped to enforce one on 
western oil technologies: by enacting it, Western countries would create a bottleneck for the Soviet 
oil flow, and cause a technological ʻreverse salientʼ in Soviet trading and military power.43 
In hindsight, the 1962 embargo on oil pipes and pipeline technology marked a foundational decision 
that became a template for future USSR-USA conflicts, as shown by the embargo on pipeline 
technologies implemented in the early 1980s by Ronald Reaganʼs government, which strained US 
relations with the UK and the European Community.44 Back to the summer of 1961, while in the 
words of US delegates at NATO the main discursive line was that European countriesʼ Soviet trade 
was allegedly imperiling the security the entire Western bloc, it is not easy to assess to what extent 
American responses reflected genuine security concerns, or were rather the disguised commercial 
interests of US oil majors.45 During the NATO debate, the latter interests were never named, but 
their presence lingered in the discussions and is revealed by the constant contacts between the 
American representatives and officers from US oil companies. It would probably not be too far 
from truth to argue that these two preoccupations dovetailed finely and aimed at the same target.
Indeed in 1963, the World Petroleum review admitted that the first demand to use NATO and US 
diplomatic channels to restrict trade in oil between the West and the USSR had been made in 
November 1960 at an annual meeting of the American Petroleum Institute, by Gulf Oilʼs President, 
Ernest Brockett, and by Jersey Standardʼs President, Monroe Rathbone. Jersey recommended 
exactly what Reifmanʼs proposal was designed to achieve: a NATO agreement on a list of strategic 
materials the sale of which would be prohibited, including those allowing them to complete their 
41 Sławomir Lotysz, “Democratizing access to modern drugs in postwar Eastern Europe”.
42 Patrick J. Haney, and Walt Vanderbush, The Cuban Embargo; Peter Schwab, Cuba. On radioisotopes embargo, see: 
Angela N. H. Creager, “Radioisotopes as Political Instruments, 1946-1953,” 219-39.
43 Mitchell, Carbon Democracy; Hughes, Networks of Power.
44 Högselius, Red Gas, 188-90; Richard Aldous, Reagan and Thatcher, 121.
45 Leopolodo Nuti, “Commitment to Nato and Domestic Politics”, 374.
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pipeline system and refineries in Eastern Europe.46
Whatever the rationale of the American strategy at NATO, the Washington groupʼs report asserted 
that in order to complete their pipeline system, the Soviets would need significant foreign 
assistance. The USSR had already been importing large-diameter pipes from abroad for a few years. 
NATO members had not prevented these kinds of exports ever since the Coordinating Committee 
for Multilateral Export Controls (CoCom) – an informal non-treaty organization established soon 
after World War II by the powers allied with the US and NATO to limit the flow of technology to 
the Eastern bloc – had reduced restrictions on pipe and oil equipment exports to the Soviet Bloc in 
1958. In the 1958 review of international strategic controls, however, almost all items relative to the 
oil industry had been deleted or downgraded to Watch List status, which only required reporting 
deliveries to the Eastern Bloc to the Atlantic Allianceʼs authorities. Since Soviet demand for large-
diameter pipes had been limited, these items had been deleted from the list.47 
As a consequence of such regulatory relaxation, by the spring of 1961 the Soviets had placed, or 
were negotiating new orders with West Germany, Italy, Sweden and Japan.48  Soviet companies were 
also trying to acquire the new industrial technology required to produce the pipes, and by the end of 
1960, had already been in contact with German firms, to negotiate the use of a new spiral welding 
process. The German innovation enabled the construction of pipes from long strips of steel plate 
fitted together to form helical seams, a process which improved the quality of pipelines, by 
minimizing leaks.49 It was exactly the ease with which the Soviets could acquire foreign technology 
drove the US to propose the embargo, in a clear manifestation of ʻpipe technopoliticsʼ. The request, 
however, triggered a firm British reaction at the following ECONAD meetings.
The British counterargument: embargo ineffective and a threat to trade
Considering that the UK was top of the list in general Soviet trade, it may not come as a surprise 
that the British would object to the American argument about the military threat represented by 
46 Boris Rachkov, “Oil, Trade, and Politics,”14-20. Source reported: World Petroleum, May 1963, p. 29; AHTOTAL – 
Fonds Total-CFP, b. 92.26/31, fd. Pétrole soviétique, ʼStatement of position on the threat of Communist trade,ʼ 19 
January 1962. pp. 7-8.
47 PPS (1958) “Les exportations aux pays communistes sont rendues plus faciles”, XXV (9): 347. On the history of 
CoCom, see: Michael Mastanduno (1992) Economic containment.
48 The Soviets had placed orders for 240 kt in Italy, 135 kt in Sweden and 420 kt in Germany. PPS (1961) “Le réseau
de pipe-lines U.R.S.S.-Europe de lʼEst”, XXVIII (6): 204; PPS (1962) “Le potentiel dʼexportation russe”, XXIX (4):
127.
49 NATOA – AC/127(O)R/2, confidential, ʻECONAD, Ad Hoc Study Group on Soviet Oil Policy, Meeting held at the
Permanent Headquarters, 30 and 31 January 1961, Decision Sheet,ʼ 10 February 1961, p. 4.
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Druzhba. However, if one considers the oil sector alone, British firms (Shell and British Petroleum) 
would achieve significant benefits from an embargo. So the standpoint taken by the UK with 
respect to the embargo turned out to be the result of a domestic clash of interests. As mentioned, the 
British government had implemented an embargo on Soviet oil and oil products in 1959. It is 
possible that the inter-ministerial discrepancies emerged at the time of that embargo, returned to the 
surface. In 1959, the opinion of the Ministry of Power had prevailed over that of the Board of 
Trade, which favored a continuation of trade with the Soviets. 
This time, however, the opinion of the Board of Trade was supported by the Treasury, whose Joint 
Permanent Secretary, Frank Lee, had earlier been the Permanent Secretary of the Board of Trade. 
Lee was open to the possibility of British oil companies reaching an ʻaccommodationʼ with the 
Soviets, meaning some sort of gentlemenʼs agreement, but his proposal was firmly opposed by 
British majors. However by early 1960 the Treasury already doubted oil would be of crucial 
significance to the countryʼs balance of payments when compared to the remaining trade sectors, 
and its opinion was the tilt of the scales. Many British manufacturing companies were trading with 
the Soviet Union, and the significance of these exchanges exceeded that of oil.50 So an embargo 
made little economic sense to the British Treasury. 
That was part of the argument that the British delegate at NATO sought to defend at ECONAD 
meetings. Not only, he asserted, would a ban pose difficulties for the exporting industries of 
member countries. It would also either be ineffective or only postpone increases in the oil exports 
from the Eastern Bloc until the Soviets arranged to produce the necessary equipment themselves. In 
fact, he argued, it would push the Russians into scale up their production installations.  The British 
delegation replied to the American data with its own data, which contradicted the former. 51 The 
predominantly military nature of the pipeline, asserted by the Americans, was denied by the British. 
The latter maintained that since the embargo would cover all large-diameter pipes and related 
equipment, it would have to include all possible materials and equipment useful in the construction 
and installation of pipelines. But these included items in general use such as valves and earth-
moving equipment, which surely were not strategically sensitive technologies.52 An embargo would 
50 Jensen-Eriksen, “British government, business and the Soviet Cold War oil offensive, 1957-1964”. Sources reported: 
TNA – T236/6237, “Russian oil”, Sir Frank Lee, 7 April 1961; Treasury (T) 236/6441, “Note of the meeting on 6 
July 1961,” G. R. Walker, 10 July 1961.
51 NATOA – AC/127-R/71, confidential, ʽECONAD, Meeting held at the Permanent Headquarters, on 20 July 1961,
Decision Sheet,ʼ 4 August 1961, p. 4; NATOA – AC/127-D/83/1, secret, ʻECONAD, Soviet oil and gas pipelines, 
Note by the Secretary,ʼ 17 October 1961, pp. 3-4. Unfortunately,  I could not retrieve the name of the British 
delegate in the NATO archives.
52 NATOA – AC/127-R/76, secret, ʻECONAD, Meeting held at the Permanent Headquarters on 19 October 1961,ʼ 28
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then heavily and unnecessarily hit a number of branches of the European industry.
When in March 1962, French representatives proposed that NATO countries accept a moral 
obligation to impede their nationals entering into new contracts for deliveries of large-diameter 
pipes to the Soviet Bloc during embargo discussions, the British reaction to the looming danger 
clarified that the ʻspecial relationshipʼ existing between the UK and the US would not go so far as 
to put Britainʼs Soviet trade in jeopardy.53 The UK delegate questioned ECONADʼs competence in 
debating the matter, and invoked the help of the Economic Adviser to the UK Joint Intelligence 
Bureau, Edward Radice. Radice stressed the British preference for a technical and economic 
analysis vis-à-vis strategic/military aspects. He maintained that, in general, implementing economic 
measures to stem industrial efforts had proved ineffective, because economic systems were much 
more flexible than was generally supposed.54 
As for the 40” pipes, Radice estimated that Soviet requirements for Druzhba were 400 kt, not 1.2 
Mt as the American estimates seemed to imply: in fact, the latter estimates referred to the overall 
Soviet requirements for oil and gas pipeline systems, not to the one system that was seen as 
threatening for the West, namely Druzhba. Now Radice maintained that, considering the USSRʼs 
expected production - Soviet manufacturers had by then managed to acquire a fair command of the 
process of production of large-diameter pipes - plus the deliveries from Germany and Italy under 
existing contracts, the gap would eventually be small, and the Soviets could cover it if they faced an 
embargo. For example, they might try and step up production of 40” pipes, or use smaller diameters 
and double the lines of such pipe if necessary (although – but Radice did not mention this aspect – 
in the latter case the production of smaller pipes would have to be doubled, thus generating further 
industrial issues).55
The main argumentative lever on which the British were insisting regarded the usage flexibility of 
Soviet 40” pipes. From information in their possession, they knew that the Soviets, unlike European 
customary technical specificities providing for higher pressure in oil pipes than in gas pipes, were 
October 1961, p. 5.
53 NATOA - AC/127-R/86, secret, ʻECONAD, Corrigendum to AC/127-R/86 (dated 13th March, 1962),ʼ 16 March 
1962, p. 2. The ʻSpecial Relationshipʼ is a phrase coined by Winston Churchill in 1946, and used to describe the 
exceptionally close political, diplomatic, cultural, economic, military and historical relations between the United 
Kingdom and the United States. David Reynolds, “A ʻSpecial Relationshipʼ?,” 1-20.
54 NATOA – AC/127-R/87, secret, ʻECONAD, Meeting held at the Permanent Headquarters on 22 March 1962, 
Decision Sheet,ʼ 29 March 1962, p. 5. The British delegate was presumably A. K. Potters, who had taken part in all 
meetings from 1957 to 1959 with no interruptions. Unfortunately, retrieving from NATO archives the names of 
national ECONAD representatives after December 1959 proved impossible.
55 NATOA – AC/127-R/87, p. 6.
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planning to manufacture oil and gas pipes with similar pressure requirements. In doing that, they 
had decided to favor flexibility over economic advantage. The equal-pressure requirement would 
allow Soviet 40”-pipe production to be used indifferently for oil or gas: all manufacturers could 
then produce the same kind of pipes, and that would result in one large production of 40” pipes 
instead of two differentiated, smaller productions of oil and gas pipes. It was this flexibility, the 
British maintained, that would make the embargo ineffective.56 
But was Soviet economy as flexible as Radice maintained? Not for the US delegation, which 
retorted that the Soviets were not going to interrupt their gas expansion program, since any 
interruption in that plan could lead to delays in output for military purposes.57 Thus, the Soviet 
large-diameter pipe gap would be significant, and so would the embargo. While the ʻspecial 
relationshipʼ was deteriorating over technical estimates, it concomitantly polarized the debate at 
NATO, where it soon appeared that the British government was not the only one alarmed by the 
embargo proposal.
A technical distinction gone unheeded
Representatives of other countries with large trading stakes with the Soviets in oil and oil industry 
equipment were not at all convinced that an embargo was a desirable solution. In early 1962, in 
order to reassure NATO allies, the US representative at ECONAD clarified that the proposal was 
not intended to prevent existing contracts being honored. The clarification was welcomed with a 
sigh of relief by the Italians and Germans (though such reliance would later prove fallacious), and 
earned Belgian, French, Dutch, Portuguese and Turkish approval.58 
As for the French government, it supported the embargo from the very beginning. Like most other 
NATO countries, France had no interests in the Soviet pipe trade, and had much to gain in impeding 
cheap Soviet oil from ruining its plans of exporting French-controlled, Algerian oil to the European 
Community. Indeed, as highlighted in December 1959 by the Financial Times with respect to ENIʼs 
Soviet purchases, imports from the USSR would be a tough blow to French aspirations for Algerian 
oil, all the more so as French oil companies had previously applied pressure on Italy to buy their oil 
instead.59 A similar ʻnationalʼ argument may be made regarding the Netherlands and the interest of 
56 Ibid., 6.
57 Ibid., 9-10.
58 NATOA – AC/127-R/86, p. 1. 
59 ASENI - Fondo ENI, Estero, Rapporti commerciali con l’estero, b. 2, fd. 7DA, ‘Altro petrolio sovietico per l’Italia’, 
Financial Times, 11 December 1959. 
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Shell in an embargo. On the contrary, Italian acquiescence was unexpected, especially in light of 
ENI-Soviet relations. A rationale for such stance can be found in the fact that during the embargo 
discussion, the Italian government was effectively torpedoing the NATO Study Group on Soviet Oil 
Policy through its firm opposition to any effective measure that would force a reduction of Soviet 
imports.60 Any strong opposition to the pipe embargo, the practical consequences of which were 
economically less problematic for Italy than a stop in oil imports, would be most embarrassing to 
the Italian authorities. It would also be pointless, since British hostility and German hesitation (see 
below) were currently preventing the project from being implemented. In addition, thanks to the 
favorable stance the Americans took to existing contracts, ENI could at least be reassured that no 
major diplomatic accident would occur between them and the Soviets.
The German government dithered. The German position was more articulated than that of other 
countries, since large sectors of the German Parliament as well as the industrial circles opposed the 
embargo, while the ruling Christian Democrat government would not detach from US position. 
West German firms had been selling large-diameter pipes to the USSR since 1959, taking advantage 
of Washingtonʼs implementation of a policy prohibiting US firms to sell the USSR this kind of pipe: 
the amount of pipe sold by German firms had increased from 3.2 kt in 1958 to 255.4 kt in 1962. In 
addition in October 1962, three large firms from the Ruhr region, namely Mannesmann, Hoesch and 
Phoenix-Rheinrohr, signed a contract to supply the USSR with 163 kt of 40” steel pipe, in exchange 
for pig iron.61 
German firms were therefore largely involved in steel pipe trade with the Soviet: however, because 
of its strict political allegiance with – and in fact, dependence on – US policy, the German 
government could not oppose the embargo from a political standpoint. It may still be able to do that, 
however, from a technical standpoint: if the pipes involved in the German-Soviet trade were 
categorized as gas pipes, and thus not strategically relevant to the crux of the embargo, German 
firms may skirt the NATO resolution and honor their agreements with the Soviets. Thus the German 
delegation proposed that gas pipes not be blockaded, and advanced an argument to make a 
distinction between oil and gas 40” pipes.62 
60 NATOA – AC/127(O)WP/2 (Revised)/2, confidential, ʻECONAD, Ad Hoc Study Group on Soviet Oil Policy, 
Comments by the Italian Government on AC/127(O)WP/2 (Revised)ʼ, 28 April 1961; NATOA – AC/127-R/71, 
confidential, ʻECONAD, Meeting held at the Permanent Headquarters, on 20 July 1961, Decision Sheetʼ, 4 August 
1961, pp. 3-4.
61 Figures are reported from Vneshnaia Torgovlia [recte: Vneshnyaya torgovlya] za 1963 – god, 237. Cited in: Stent, 
From embargo to Ostpolitik, 101. 
62 Stent, From embargo to Ostpolitik, Ch. 5; NATOA – AC/127-R/87, p. 11-2.
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At the time of the NATO debate, gas was not regarded as a strategic item, and only from the late 
1960s would gas purchases gradually acquire a higher importance in East-West trade. In the early 
1960s, gas trade was still relatively little developed in Western Europe, as were gas transmission 
infrastructures (though with significant exceptions in regions such as the Netherlands, North Italy or 
France). It is therefore not surprising that gas pipes were not seen as on a par with oil pipes in 
strategic terms.63
Now, how could the two kinds of 40” pipes be distinguished? We have seen before that, while the 
possibility of such a distinction in Soviet pipes was unlikely because of the equal-pressure 
requirement demanded to local manufacturers, Western pipes could in principle be distinguished 
from pressure characteristics. The core point of the debate therefore regarded such characteristics. 
The American Petroleum Institute maintained that 40” pipes for gas pipelines (characterized by 
lower pressure than oil pipes) could be used for the transport of both oil and gas, and that therefore, 
it would be possible to transport oil in the 40” pipes supplied for gas pipelines. The Germans 
disagreed, and challenged the US instituteʼs viewpoint. When trading with the Soviets, German pipe 
manufacturers had been required to supply them with an impact factor - the ratio of a dynamic force 
to its static weight - for temperatures of -40 ºC and +20 ºC. That seemed to indicate that this pipe 
was going to be used for gas pipelines, since such qualitative requirements, which were responsible 
for a substantial increase in the cost of pipes, were “pointless in the case of oil pipe since only at 
temperatures above 15 ºC was oil sufficiently fluid for conveyance by pipeline”.64
According to the German note, it was to be supposed that the USSR, like any other country, would 
consider its pipeline projects from the standpoint of economical operation, and that seemed to rule 
out the use for the conveyance of oil of pipes specifically intended for gas. However, the German 
experts added a final clause to their document, acquiescing to the American argument that in theory 
there was the possibility that the two types of pipe could to some extent be regarded as 
interchangeable.65 This linguistically nuanced specification, underlining a possibility that looked in 
any case remote through a jargon characteristic of scientific papers, may also have incautiously 
opened the way to its own ultimate dismissal. As a matter of fact, in the meetings that followed the 
German statement, no further mention was made of it. 
63 Alain Beltran, and Jean-Pierre Williot, Les routes du gaz, 109-13. See also: Högselius, Red Gas, for a history of 
East-West gas trading from the late 1960s to our days.
64 NATOA – AC/127-R/87, p. 11. The quote is from: NATOA – AC/127-R/87, p. 12.
65 Ibid., 12. My italics. 
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The embargo approval and its consequences
As no agreement could be reached at ECONAD especially because of the Anglo-American conflict, 
the embargo proposal finally reached the North Atlantic Council (NAC) in the spring of 1962.66 
Eventually thirteen countries out of fifteen agreed to the Councilʼs recommendations. But here too 
British contrariety became patent.67 The work of a further study group was necessary before the 
conclusion was reached at ECONAD that the Soviets would indeed be short of 40” pipes, and that if 
such deficits were not going to be filled by further imports from the free world, the pipeline system 
might be delayed for a period varying from eight months to over two years.  As for pipeline 
equipment, lack of sufficient information ruled out any final decisions.68  
When the expertsʼ draft was eventually debated at ECONAD, its members agreed to submit it to the 
NAC with the recommendation that member countries, “under their own responsibility”, should “to 
the extent possible”: stop deliveries of large diameter pipe to the Soviet bloc under existing 
contracts; and prevent new contracts for such deliveries. It was decided the Council would monitor 
the situation.69 In the end, therefore, the provision covered existing contracts: in archival sources, I 
could not retrieve a rationale regarding the modification of this point, nor any mention of reactions 
from West Germany or Italy (although it is quite plausible that these were vocal). What we do know 
is that the disrespect of the ʻexisting contracts clauseʼ caused serious trouble to West Germany and 
Italy in terms of their trade relations with the Soviets. The embargo was finally approved by the 
Council on 21 November 1962 in the form of a recommendation (and thus, at least de jure, 
endowed with a less stringent value than an order), but its enforcement was going to be problematic.
In early 1963, alleged Polish attempts to place new large-diameter pipe orders in Italy caused the 
German government to react by requesting member countries take the necessary steps to prevent the 
execution of Soviet bloc orders placed later then the date of the embargoʼs enactment.70 The 
66 NATOA – C-M(62)51, secret, ʻSoviet Pipeline System - Note by the Chairman of ECONAD,ʼ 2 May 1962, passim.
67 NATOA – C-R(62)26, secret, ʻSummary record of a meeting of the Council, held at the Permanent Headquarters on
17 May 1962,ʼ 23 May 1962, pp. 11-12.
68 NATOA – C-R(62)40, secret, ʻSummary record of a meeting of the Council, held at the Permanent Headquarters on 
8 August 1962,ʼ 21 August 1962, pp. 9-11; NATOA – AC/127-D/107, secret, ʻECONAD, Soviet Pipeline System, 
Report of the Group of Experts,ʼ 8 October 1962; NATOA – AC/127-R/97, secret, ʻECONAD, Meeting held at the 
Permanent Headquarters on 5 October 1962, Decision Sheet,ʼ 10 October 1962; NATOA - AC/127-D/107; C-
M(62)104, secret, ʻSoviet Pipeline System, Report by ECONAD,ʼ 29 October 1962; NATOA - Annex to AC/127-
R/99, secret, ʻSoviet Pipeline System, Statement of the United Kingdom Positionʼ, 6 November 1962, pp. 1-2.  
69 Quoted from: NATOA – AC/127-D/107/1, secret, ʻECONAD, Soviet Pipeline System, Draft Report to the Council,
Note by the Secretary,ʼ 19 October 1962, p. 2. The quotes are from: Ibid.
70 NATOA – AC/127-R/106, secret, ʻECONAD, Meeting held at the Permanent Headquarters on 7 March 1963,
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tensions generated by the embargo within the German government itself, and especially between 
this and German industrialists, have been described in detail by Stent, and were linked to the 
importance for the Ruhrʼs steel industry of increasing production after a long period of stagnation.71 
Tensions visibly materialized in March, when Adenauerʼs government avoided a defeat on the 
embargo resolution by a handful of votes.72 Obviously Soviet firms involved in the German 
contracts, and more in general the Soviet government, were not happy about the cancellation of 
existing contracts: they saw the German about turn as an openly hostile act, an infringement of the 
principle of international law, and reserved the right to take retaliatory measures.73
The embargo,  notes Stent, and its approval  by the German government in  particular,  marked a
diplomatic victory for the US. In late 1962, ongoing negotiations between France and West Ger-
many with respect to a friendship agreement that finally materialized in January 1963, suggested the
US administration that Germany was favorable to aligning with France, and with the European poli-
cy proposed by French President, Charles de Gaulle, who had just rejected UKʼs application to join
the European Community. Thus the alignment of Germany to the US over the embargo issue may
be seen as a way for the German government to appease the US government in such time of politi-
cal tension between the two countries.74
As for Italy, one of the NATO reports mentioned 181 kt of 40” pipes as the amount that Italian firms 
was to deliver to the Soviets. Yet we know that the 1960 ENI-SNE agreement scheduled deliveries 
for 240 kt of 40” pipe. The missing 59 kt were at the core of an interesting episode, which 
paralleled the embargo discussion. The Italian iron and steel manufacturer that had been selected to 
supply the Soviets with large-diameter pipes was Finsider, a public agency on good terms with ENI. 
With a view to complying with its Soviet orders, Finsider had started the construction of a plant in 
southern Italy. 
Materials for the construction of the Italian plant were being provided by American company, US
Steel. When the company managers realized the factory would supply the Soviets, they prohibited
Finsider  from using their  equipment to produce pipes,  and threatened to stop deliveries for the
plantʼs equipment and spare parts. The companyʼs president, Ernesto Manuelli, immediately dis-
Decision Sheet,ʼ 13 March 1963, p. 1.
71 Stent, From embargo to Ostpolitik, 93-153. 
72 NATOA – C-R(63)14, secret, ʻSummary record of a meeting of the Council, held at the Permanent Headquarters on 
20 March 1963,ʼ 27 March 1963, p. 23.
73 Stent, From embargo to Ostpolitik, 113-4.
74 Stent, From embargo to Ostpolitik, 95-6.
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cussed the matter with ENIʼs executives, and lamented being “forced by Italian and American au-
thorities” to cut its Soviet deliveries by 25 percent. Manuelli had suggested the Russians purchase
the remaining quantity from the German firm Phoenix-Rheinrohr, which had worked with ENI in
the past. The Soviet company, however, refused to comply.75 
At his meeting with ENI executives, Manuelli argued that he had already committed to the Americ-
ans not to export more than 180 kt of large-diameter pipes to the USSR, and called on ENI manage-
ment to mediate between Finsider and the Soviet companies. Finding a solution was of paramount
importance, since a breach of part of the ENI-SNE contract by one of ENIʼs partners could jeopard-
ise the whole deal. An irritated Enrico Mattei, the ENI President, therefore replied to Manuelli that
it was not worth modifying the Finsider contract because of American pressure.76 
Mattei was also disappointed that the Italian authorities seemed to support, or at least not to oppose,
American pressures. Manuelli and the management of the Soviet enterprises that had commissioned
the pipes, Siderexport and Promsyrioimport, eventually reached a compromise by early March. Fin-
siderʼs deliveries were reduced by 60 kt, and a clause was added to the new contract, to the effect
that the reduction would not affect other exchanges included in the 1960 agreement.77 Although
there was no direct repercussion on the comprehensive agreement, the whole affair did cause the
Soviet First Deputy Foreign Minister, Vasili Kuznetsov, to let ENI know he felt “deeply offended”
by Finsiderʼs attitude.78 
With regard to Britain, the oddity of its position vis-à-vis the embargo was instead highlighted by an 
episode occurring in April 1963, when NATOʼs General Secretary, Stikker, was informed by the US 
government that a British firm, South Durham Steel, was negotiating with the Soviets in regard to 
large-diameter pipe purchases. Although the UK had not accepted the embargo, the Americans 
warned this would seriously put the provision through the wringer. In response to the news, US 
75 ASENI - Fondo ENI, Presidenza Raffaele Girotti, b. 264, fd. 482E: G. Ratti, ʻPromemoria riservato per lʼIng. 
Matteiʼ, 10 February 1962; G. Ratti, ʻPromemoria riservato per lʼIng. Matteiʼ, 12 February 1962 (the quote is from 
this document).
76 ASENI - Fondo ENI, Presidenza Raffaele Girotti, b. 264, fd. 482E, G. Ratti, ʻPromemoria riservato per lʼIng. 
Matteiʼ, 12 February 1962; ASENI - Fondo ENI, Presidenza Eugenio Cefis, b. 24, fd. CB8: letter, Enrico Mattei to 
Ernesto Manuelli, 12 February 1962 (the quote is from this document); note for the Foreign Minister [Antonio 
Segni], unsigned [prob. Giuseppe Ratti], February 1962. 
77 ASENI - Fondo ENI, Presidenza Raffaele Girotti, b. 264, fd. 482E, G. Ratti, ʻColloquio con lʼAmbasciatore Ortona 
sulla fornitura di tubi Finsider allʼU.R.S.S.ʼ, 14 February 1962; ASENI - Fondo ENI, Presidenza Eugenio Cefis, b. 
24, fd. CB8, letter, Ernesto Manuelli to Enrico Mattei, 7 March 1962. 
78 Quoted from: ASENI - Fondo ENI, Presidenza Raffaele Girotti, b. 264, fd. 482E, G. Ratti, ʻPromemoria per lʼIng. 
Matteiʼ, 30 March 1962. My own translation.
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diplomats contacted their British counterparts to settle the matter.79 
According to NATO documents, these and other similar attempts to break the embargo did not 
ultimately succeed. By 1963, France and Italy had refused a number of contracts; the West Germans 
had embargoed 203 kt of 40” pipes, despite orders having been placed before the Councilʼs 
decision. Japan and Sweden also generally cooperated.80 Maintaining that the outcome of the 
embargo had been successful, the NAC noted the furious reaction of the Soviet Prime Minister, 
Nikita Khrushchev, in a television speech on 27 February 1963, where he vehemently attacked the 
embargo. In addition the Soviets also complained to Germany, and the blockade was extensively 
covered in the Soviet media. 
However, other sources do not seem to agree with this analysis. On the contrary, the embargo seems 
to have been successful only to a limited extent: the construction of the pipeline system was indeed 
delayed, but by only one year. Scheduled to be completed in late 1963, the system was only 
completed in late 1964. The measure adopted by NATO was not able to stop Soviet oil exports to 
Western Europe either, as these continued to increase in the early 1960s. By 1970, SNE had been 
exporting wherever it had found the opportunity.81 
Energy expert and former CIA officer, Robert Ebel, contends that Sweden, which was not a NATO 
member, continued to deal with the Soviets, and that small amounts of pipes were also delivered to 
the USSR by Italy and Germany. According to Ebel, the amounts of 40” pipes imported by the 
USSR may have been enough to complete Druzhba by late 1963, but that did not happen because of 
the Soviet Unionʼs ongoing program of development of natural gas production, which directed the 
bulk of 40” pipes to that aim. This factor, not the embargo, would be the reason why, Ebel 
maintains, Druzhba was eventually completed in 1964. In addition, in order to frustrate the embargo 
and manufacture more 40” pipes, a number of Soviet pipe mills were converted from small- to 
large-diameter pipes. All in all, therefore, the embargo seems to have not so much affected the 
Soviet production of 40” pipes as that of smaller diameters, which the USSR had to decrease to 
79 NATOA – C-R(63)21, secret, ʻSummary record of a meeting of the Council, held at the Permanent Headquarters on 
24 April 1963,ʼ 2 May 1963, p. 8; NATOA - AC/127-WP/188/1, secret, ʻECONAD, Sale of large diameter pipe to 
Soviet Bloc countries - Addendum to the note by the French Delegation circulated as AC/127-WP/188,ʼ 6 October 
1966, p. 1. On Japanʼs foreign relations in the 1950s and 1960s, see: Kevin Cooney, Japanʼs Foreign Policy Since 
1945, 23-36.
80 NATOA – C-R(63)21, p. 9; Ebel, Communist Trade in Oil and Gas, 184.
81 NATOA – AC/127-D/220, confidential, ECONAD, “Sale of large-diameter pipe to Soviet Bloc countries - Note 
forwarded by the Delegations of France and of the Federal Republic of Germany,” 29 August 1966, p. 1; Stern, 
Soviet Oil and Gas Exports to the West, 27, 30.
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make room for larger-diameter pipes.82 
About four years after the enforcement of the embargo, ECONAD itself admitted that its main, 
inadvertent result had been a stimulation of the growth of Soviet pipe production. While such 
production still left much to be desired as far as quality was concerned, the Soviet Union could now 
use its own manufacturing capacity to implement any project which would be important either from 
the strategic viewpoint, or from that of its economic policy. The embargo lasted until November 
1966, when the French and West German governments requested its cancellation, arguing that its 
scope had been reached, and that the Soviet rolling mills had by then recovered their backlog.83 
Were the American and most West European diplomacies really acting in European securityʼs 
interests when trying to limit Soviet oil exports? Historian Geir Lundestad disagrees, and maintains 
the US was more interested in perpetuating Europeʼs dependence on American national companies.  
His claim, I believe, has a grain of truth in it, but does not explain the whole picture. On the one 
hand, strong economic interests were the elephant in the room at NATO discussions on trade 
restrictions with the Soviets: the plans and lobbying of oil companies, whether American or 
European, could not be evoked in the Allianceʼs discussions, but were obviously there.84 On the 
other hand, however, US military circles appeared genuinely concerned by the military implications 
of Soviet oil strategy, and such anxiety may have been increased by nebulous and partial 
information on Soviet industrial capabilities that was sieved through the Iron Curtain. 
While there is little doubt that the pipe embargo represented a successful American attempt to alter 
the East-West trade policies of its European allies, whether the intended goal of jeopardizing Soviet 
pipeline plans was effective to the extent the Americans desired, is highly dubious. Indeed, it 
appears to me that the question is to be answered in the negative. But the pipeline issue may have 
been only a part of a larger strategy: as noted by Stent, the US government was aware that most of 
its European allies were against an embargo measure, and its insistence in having it passed at NATO 
may have been a matter of principle, stated in order to affirm US predominance in the Atlantic 
Alliance in East-West trade.85 
82 Ebel, Communist Trade in Oil and Gas, 184-5, 231. Source reported at p. 231: Vneshnyaya Torgovlya, “Lessons of 
an Ill-Fated Embargo,” 12 December 1966: 50-1.
83 NATOA – AC/127-D/220, p. 2; NATOA – AC/127-WP/188 (19 September 1966), AC/127-R/185 (same date), 
AC/127-WP/190 (21 September 1966), AC/127-WP/192 (4 October 1966), AC/127-R/194 (30 January 1967).
84 Geir Lundestad, The United States and Western Europe since 1945. 
85 This thesis is defended in: Stent, From embargo to Ostpolitik, 103.
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Conclusions
This article aimed at developing two strands of analysis: first, extending to the oil industry the 
concept of ʻtechnopoliticsʼ formulated by Gabrielle Hechtʼs works; second, applying that concept to 
the social construction of  technological artifacts. As for the first strand, by highlighting the 
geopolitical dynamics of transnational trade in oil technology in the Cold War context, I have 
shown that the interests of governments and their respective oil companies were so tightly 
intertwined as to shape national strategies at NATO, and cause different degrees of tensions among 
allied countries, the clearest manifestation of which can be found in the temporary cracking of 
Anglo-American special relationship. I have then argued that oil pipe technology was the means by 
which these national interests materialized in the debate. The winner of the debate would ultimately 
determine the Western blocʼs strategy vis-à-vis Soviet oil trade. The choices to be made about 
allowing or restricting the sale of certain kinds of pipes were neither purely technical nor purely 
political: they were instead ʻtechnopoliticalʼ, in the sense that aspects concerning the technology 
and the geopolitics of pipes became indistinguishable in the course of the one and a half year during 
which ECONAD discussed the Druzhba matter. 
By exposing the assemblage of national narratives, and the ways these were strengthened, 
weakened and modified throughout the development of the pipe debate, my study also further 
clarifies the fragmentary and ambiguous nature of the Western alliance, and shows that, while US 
political influence certainly gave the American a hardly disputable hegemonic role within NATO, 
the strategy US delegates had to deploy to obtain a quasi-unanimous acceptance of the embargo had 
to come to terms with the exigences of lesser partners. This tweaking operation took a long way, 
and countries with large trading stakes with the Soviets tried to delay a final decision as long as 
possible, in order to minimize the consequences of the embargo. Also, the final formulation of the 
embargo proved to be significantly watered down with respect to USʼs initial proposal, and lesser 
NATO members played a crucial role in this outcome. As Lino Camprubí has recently noted, 
“[c]ompetition between the two superpowers accounts for only part of the story”: this research 
contributes to completing the picture by considering the importance of third powers, and stressing 
the processes of co-constructed hegemony within one of the Cold Warʼs most influential 
transnational organizations.86 
86 Lino Camprubí, “Resource Geopolitics: Cold War Technologies, Global Fertilizers, and the Fate of Western Sahara”, 
697.
27
Interestingly, while the debate occurred in a geopolitical and economic context that was quite 
different from the present one, it has nevertheless marked similarities with the current global 
hydrocarbon scene, as many of the arguments advanced at the time remain at the order of the day: 
Europeʼs energy vulnerability and need of diversification of energy sources; its dependence on 
foreign hydrocarbon sources (Cold wartime Soviet oil threat being replaced by actual Soviet gas 
dependency); but also national governmentsʼ subjection in foreign affairs to energy company 
strategies.87 Thus this study contributes to further our understanding of long-term, global oil 
dynamics.
As far as the second strand of my analysis – social construction of technological artifacts – is 
concerned, this article extends the existing studies on Cold War technologies to an industrial sector 
that has received constant attention from economic studies, but very little by the domain of the 
history of technology. Even when the technoscience of oil industry has been  considered, the focus 
has mainly been on exploration technologies, such as those involved in geophysical prospecting, 
whereas more ʻindustry-orientedʼ and less flashy technological processes, such as those involved, 
for example, in metallurgy, have been neglected.88 This article starts to fill this gap. 
As I have shown, in the embargo debate issues of metallurgy, as well as estimations of industrial 
technical capabilities became the cornerstone criterion on which to build powerful narratives, and 
were wielded as scientific weapons on which to ground attack and defense strategies. We may 
therefore want to paraphrase Hoskins and Hermanʼs quote about Soviet oil exports mentioned 
earlier in the paper, and say that in the case analyzed here the issue of pipe exports to the USSR did 
not just come to constitute a political hand that had worn the technological glove: here there was no 
glove to be worn.89 Pipe technology was not a cover for politics: it was, on the contrary, an essential 
part of it. 
Bibliography
Archival sources
Archives Historiques du Groupe Total, La Défense
87 Mathias Reymond, “European key issues concerning natural gas: Dependence and vulnerability”; Enrique 
Palazuelos and Rafael Fernández, “The importance of transnational corporations in the supply of oil to Europe: 
Implications”. 
88 Roberto Cantoni and Leucha Veneer, “Underwater and Underground: Gatekeeping Oil Exploration during the Cold 
War”; Roberto Cantoni, “The Enemy Underground: Geostrategic Intelligence and the War in Algeria”.
89 See p. 9 of this paper. 
28
Archives Nationales, Pierrefitte-sur-Seine
Archivio storico ENI, Pomezia (Rome)
Archivio storico del Ministero degli affari esteri, Rome
National Archives and Records Administration, College Park, Maryland 
NATO Archives, Brussels
The National Archives, Kew
Published and unpublished sources
Aldous, Richard. Reagan and Thatcher: The Difficult Relationship. London: Random House, 2012.
Augustine, Dolores L. Red Prometheus. Engineering and Dictatorship in East Germany, 1945-
1990. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2007.
Bagnato, Bruna. Prove di Ostpolitik. Politica ed economia nella strategia italiana verso lʼUnione 
Sovietica, 1958-1963. Firenze: Olschki, 2003.
Barry, Andrew. Material politics: disputes along the pipeline. Chichester: Wiley-Blackwell, 2013.
Beltran, Alain, and Jean-Pierre Williot. Les routes du gaz. Histoire du transport de gaz naturel en 
France. Paris: Cherche Midi, 2012.
Berry, John A. “Oil and Soviet Policy in the Middle East”. Middle East Journal 26 (1972): 149-60.
Camprubí, Lino. “Resource Geopolitics: Cold War Technologies, Global Fertilizers, and the Fate of 
Western Sahara”. Technology and Culture 56 (3: 2015): 676-703. 
Cantoni, Roberto. “The Enemy Underground: Geostrategic Intelligence and the War in Algeria”. 
History and Technology (forthcoming).
Cantoni, Roberto, and Leucha Veneer. “Underwater and Underground: Gatekeeping Oil Exploration 
during the Cold War.” In The Surveillance Imperative: The Rise of the Geosciences during the Cold 
War, edited by Simone Turchetti and Peder Roberts, 45-66. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2014.
Catta, Emmanuel. Victor De Metz. De la CFP au Groupe Total. Paris: Total Edition Presse, 1990.
Cooney, Kevin. Japanʼs Foreign Policy Since 1945. Abingdon/New York: Routledge, 2015.
Creager, Angela N. H. “Radioisotopes as Political Instruments, 1946-1953”. Dynamis 29 (2009): 
219-39. 
Ebel, Robert E. Communist Trade in Oil and Gas. New York/Washington/London: Praeger, 1970.
Haney, Patrick J., and Walt Vanderbush. The Cuban Embargo: The Domestic Politics of an 
American Foreign Policy. Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 2005.
Hecht, Gabrielle. The Radiance of France: Nuclear Power and National Identity after World War II.
29
Cambridge, Mass./London: MIT Press, 1998.
Hecht, Gabrielle. “The Power of Nuclear Things”. Technology and Culture 51 (2010): 1-30. 
Hecht, Gabrielle. Being Nuclear: Africans and the Global Uranium Trade. Cambridge, 
Mass./London: MIT Press, 2012.
Hoskins, Halford L. Problems Raised by the Soviet Oil Offensive. U. S. Senate. Committee on the 
Judiciary. Committee Print. Washington: U. S. Government Printing Office, 1962.
Hoskins, Halford L., and Leon M. Herman. Soviet Oil in the Cold War. U. S. Senate. Committee on 
the Judiciary. Committee Print. Washington: U. S. Government Printing Office, 1961.
Högselius, Per. Red Gas. Russia and the Origins of Europeʼs Energy Dependence. New York: 
Plagrave Macmillan, 2013.
Hughes, T. P. Networks of power: Electrification in western society, 1880-1930. Baltimore, MD: 
The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1983.
Jensen-Eriksen, Niklas. “The Cold War in Energy Markets. British Efforts to Contain Soviet Oil 
Exports to Non-Communist Countries, 1950-1965”. In Le pétrole et la guerre/Oil and War, edited 
by Alain Beltran. Series Enjeux internationaux 21, 191-208. Brussels: Peter Lang, 2012.
Jensen-Eriksen, Niklas. “British government, business and the Soviet Cold War oil offensive, 1957-
1964”. Paper presented at the 16th Annual Conference of the European Business History 
Association, and 1st Joint Conference with Business History Society of Japan, Paris, August 30 – 
September 1, 2012.
Krige, John. American Hegemony and the Postwar Reconstruction of Science in Europe. 
Cambridge, Mass./London: MIT Press, 2006.
Lotysz, Sławomir. “Democratizing access to modern drugs in postwar Eastern Europe”. Paper 
presented at: Democracy and Technology. Europe in Tension from the 19th to th 21st Century. 6th 
Plenary Conference of Tensions of Europe. Université Paris-Sorbonne, September 19-21, 2013.
Lundestad, Geir. The United States and Western Europe since 1945. Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 2009.
Mastanduno, Michael (1992) Economic containment: CoCom and the politics of East-West trade. 
New York: Cornell University Press.
Mitchell, Timothy. “Carbon democracy”. Economy and Society 38 (2009): 399-432.
Mitchell, Timothy. Carbon Democracy: Political Power in the Age of Oil. New York: Verso, 2011.
Nuti, Leopoldo. “Commitment to NATO and Domestic Politics: the Italian Case and Some 
Comparative”. Contemporary European History 7 (1998): 361-77. 
Palazuelos, Enrique, and Rafael Fernández, “The importance of transnational corporations in the 
supply of oil to Europe: Implications”, Energy Policy 47 (2012): 270-81.
30
Paleri, Prabhakaran. National Security: Imperatives And Challenges. New Delhi: Tata McGraw-
Hill, 2008.
Pinch, Trevor J., and Wiebe E. Bijker. “The Social Construction of Facts and Artefacts: Or How the 
Sociology of Science and the Sociology of Technology Might Benefit Each Other”. Social Studies 
of Science 14 (August 1984): 399-441. 
Rachkov, Boris. “Oil, Trade, and Politics”. International Affairs 12 (1966): 14-20. 
Reymond, Mathias. “European key issues concerning natural gas: Dependence and vulnerability”. 
Energy Policy 35 (2007): 4169-76.
Reynolds, David. “A ʻSpecial Relationshipʼ? America, Britain and the International Order Since the 
Second World War”. International Affairs 62 (1985-6): 1-20. 
Romm, Joseph J. Defining national security: the nonmilitary aspects. New York: Council on 
Foreign Relations Press, 1993.
Schwab, Peter. Cuba: Confronting the U.S. Embargo. New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 1999.
Spencer, D. L. “The Role of Oil in Soviet Foreign Economic Policy”. American Journal of 
Economy and Society 25 (1966): 91-107. 
Stent, Angela. From embargo to Ostpolitik. The political economy of West Germany-Soviet 
relations, 1955-1980. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1981.
Stern, Jonathan P. Soviet Oil and Gas Exports to the West: Commercial Transactions or Security 
Threat? Aldershot: Gower, 1987.
Turchetti, Simone. “Sword, Shield and Buoys: A History of the Nato Sub-Committee on 
Oceanographic Research, 1959–1973”. Centaurus 54 (2012): 205-231.
Yergin, Daniel. The Prize: The Epic Quest for Oil, Money, and Power. 2nd edition. New York: 
Simon & Schuster, 2009.
31
